ABSTRACT

This paper proposes a model of affective self-leadership based on Neck and Manz’s (1992) thought (i.e., cognitive) self-leadership. While cognitive self-leadership relies on visualizing and enunciating concrete actions to guide performance by way of premeditated thoughts, affective self-leadership seeks to visualize and enunciate abstract representations of one’s identity by reference to religious, philosophical, or scientific themes. Moreover, while cognitive self-leadership seeks to influence core affect by way of self-talk, limiting visualization to thought patterns that guide performance, affective self-leadership leverages visualization to influence core affect directly. Affective self-leadership may thus yield a stronger impact than cognitive self-leadership on core affect.

Keywords: affect, affective self-leadership, cognition, cognitive self-leadership, spirituality

INTRODUCTION

The challenge of leading oneself has received ample attention under various labels in the practical literature on performance motivation (e.g., Burns, 1980; Covey, 1989; Goleman, 1995; Hill, 1937; Peale, 1952), as well as in the corresponding theoretical literature (e.g., Andrasik & Heimberg, 1982; Hackman, 1986; Mahoney & Arnkoff, 1979; Neck & Manz, 1992; Seligman, 1991). However, prior to Manz (1983), the notion of self-leadership per se, which involves those mind-conditioning practices that affect one’s psychological state in order to improve one’s ability to perform well, had yet to receive a serious theoretical treatment. In contrast, as the practical literature often attests, ordinary people have frequently chanced upon effective techniques to help them think more clearly, withstand organizational pressures more easily, and achieve better focus over their own choices in life. In so doing, they have accomplished more.

Neck and Manz’s (1992) model of thought self-leadership (TSL) addresses a specific type of self-leadership, one based on managing cognitive processes. The model projects two primary processes that may help people adopt an optimal frame of reference to influence their confidence and focus in the workplace. These are self-talk, which refers to enunciating goals, intentions, and states of mind in clear words, and mental imagery, which refers to picturing successful enactment of task processes prior to initiating them in reality. Neck and Manz’s (1992) model refers only to rational (as opposed to affective) processes, but the expected outcomes of successful articulation of TSL training include affective outcomes, such as self-confidence and decreased anxiety. In a field experiment of a company that faced bankruptcy, Neck and Manz (1996) demonstrated TSL training’s positive impact on job satisfaction, self-efficacy, enthusiasm, mental performance, and constructive perceptions of the imminent bankruptcy, and negative impact on nervousness.
While its success is manifest, Neck and Manz’s (1992) theory of thought self-leadership restricts its strategies to cognitive goal-setting (cf. Locke, 1968). What is missing is an approach to formulating affective strategies. Because cognitive strategies to self-leadership lead in part to positive affectivity, which in turn leads to reduced anxiety and better performance, non-rational strategies would also seem to be worth considering for promoting the same positive affectivity. Specifically, the content of the cognition recommended by Neck and Manz (1992) and included in their training model (Neck & Manz, 1996) corresponded to the task visualization that Orlick (1986) suggested for use in training athletes. This involves the effort to imagine the successful performance of the task in question. By comparison, affective visualization strategies to self-leadership might include a purely invented state of being, rather than the conscious picturing of a process before initiating it. On this measure, the closest approximation seems to be meditation, but the available sources only treat that method as a practice for sustaining long-term benefits, rather than one by which an individual may achieve an immediate benefit, in the same timeframe as mental imaging. Biggart (1983), for example, described the self-help meditation literature as seeking to “enable people to achieve inner harmony and to become united with the disjointed self” (p. 305). There seems to be no published technique, however, to enable people to adopt an affective state of mind before confronting a challenging situation, analogous to the cognitive state of mind indicated by mental imaging in TSL.

This paper seeks to present an affective technique of self-leadership, as an example of the possibilities that may exist in this area. In so doing, it will draw on an element of Classical Greek philosophy, with some degree of comparison to Christian theology, to evoke the affective image of interest. Consistently, it will present a model of affective self-leadership to complement Neck and Manz’s (1992) model of thought, or cognitive, self-leadership.

**TRIBUTARY IDEAS**

The central idea behind the particular approach to affective self-leadership in the present paper is the Socratic illustration of the divided line, coupled with an observation concerning the role of the concepts of ἔμφως and λόγος in the Biblical story of Jesus Christ. This will be the main thesis of this paper, to follow the present literature review. Consequently, this section will address the remaining tributary ideas, including the role of imagination and affect in performance motivation, and chaos theory as a paradigmatic auxilium to achieving the target state of mind.

**Imagination and Affect in Performance Motivation**

In a very thorough conceptual treatment, Seo, Barrett, and Bartunek (2004) explored the impact on work motivation of a construct that they labeled core affect, or affective experience. In their model, core affect moderates personal judgment in both the goal-setting process and goal pursuit, so it affects task-related outcomes. Core affect refers to a sustained form of emotional state. It may be construable as mood, although the latter tends to imply both greater volatility and greater dependence on the environment for its sustenance. Seo et al. (2004) explained “mood” as “a prolonged hedonic tone and a subjective sense of activation without an object” (p. 424). Other terms, such as “emotion” per se, imply an object (ibid.). Thus, core affect refers to the underlying affective state, which explains both mood and emotion. The concept is relevant to the present study, because self-leadership seeks a sustained effect from the self-management practices that
precede the prospective challenge. Whether the affective state achieved by the individual who practices affective self-leadership is a mood or an emotion is difficult to specify, because the imagined visualization may be construable as an object, which evokes an emotion, or merely the mental manifestation of a mood (albeit in reverse). Consistently with Seo et al.’s (2004) theory, the affective self-leader would assume a feeling of positive core affect despite any overwhelming organizational challenges, and in so doing move away from an initial state of high activation and high unpleasantness (which are the primary variables in the noted model) to one of low activation and unpleasantness. This influences perceptions, which no longer focus on sources of conflict.

To elaborate on Neck and Manz (1992), whose work this paper introduced at the outset, the model of cognitive self-leadership consists of a technique of self-mastery (hence the idea of self-leadership, rather than simply leadership) that leverages self-talk and the visualization of selective mental imagery. While self-talk refers to enunciating to oneself some of the parameters of success in an upcoming task, mental imagery refers to visualizing tasks before undertaking them. On the question of mental imagery, Neck and Manz (1992) explained that the literature has mostly investigated the impact of this practice on athletes, in addition to some work in education and clinical psychology. Nevertheless, they also noted the fact that people in managerial fields often engage in mental imagery as well, such as before conducting group presentations. Neck and Manz (1992) cited a wide range of literature across several disciplines to support the notion that self-talk significantly predicts performance. As noted previously, Neck and Manz (1996) went on to demonstrate the remarkable effectiveness of a training program in thought self-leadership in a field experiment. Neck and Manz’s (1992) model of thought self-leadership refers exclusively to the use of rational cognitive methods, but affective states are among the most visible effects.

Locke’s (1968) goal-setting theory emphasizes the importance of a planner’s consciously apprehending a goal prior to pursuing it. The theory suggests an optimal level of goal difficulty, specificity, and complexity to motivate maximally. For example, a goal that is unattainable (i.e., too difficult) may destroy motivation altogether. In the context of imagination, the essence of goal-setting theory consists of bringing to consciousness the images associated with a desired trajectory of action, rather than leaving such ideas in the realm of the unconscious, where they are vague and shifting. Visualizing a plan thus raises to consciousness the key details by inducing the planner to imagine seeing the associated activities in the mind’s eye. In turn, this exercise raises the planner’s intuitive anticipation of further details. This process enhances the planner’s focus and in so doing brings out more of the planner’s motivation to initiate the needed action.

Koehler’s (1983) project planning and management technique (PPMT) is an example of how it is possible to apply goal-setting theory to practical training and procedural development to support more effective planning overall. In fact, this technique seeks to optimize the role of the creative imagination, rather than just thoughtful anticipation of the sequence of events associated with the process of a project in the planning stage. As Koehler (1983) explained, PPMT “allows the imagination to visualize the future, to understand possible plans of attack, and to evaluate one’s potential for achieving the desired results” (p. 459). This is precisely what the goal-setting technique requires. Notably, however, the imagined goal attainment sequence is realistic, rather than inventive. Thus, while the goal attainment sequence may indeed influence affect in terms of goal commitment, core affect may only benefit indirectly.
In a non-planning application, Westcott (1997) went so far as to recommend the use of photographic techniques to help students develop their ability to visualize and hence sharpen their imaginations. To exemplify how the use of photographs can enhance students’ access to the emotional content of an image, the author noted that students may “practice articulating their emotional responses to photographs and analyzing the means by which the photographs evoke those emotions as a way of preparing to do the same for passages of written description” (p. 53). Although this example may seem to deviate from the central theme of affective self-leadership, it nevertheless provides a clue to a way to evoke an affective state, namely, through visualizations that seek to evoke an emotion, rather than to represent an expected sequence of real events. In the example provided, the instructor assists students in evoking an emotion to enable them to draw out more creative rhetorical devices than would otherwise naturally emerge in their thoughts, to support their creative expression. Therefore, the causal direction is emotion, followed by thought. This technique hints at the method introduced in this paper, namely, an image whose only role is to evoke core affect.

**Chaos Theory as an Auxilium for Effective Visualization**

The paradigm of self-organizing complexity benefits from several versions, which drive variations in terminology that can cause confusion. This variety is reducible to three for most purposes, namely, systems theory (Bertalanffy, 1937), complexity theory (Prigogine, 1947), and chaos theory (Lorenz, 1972; Mandelbrot, 1967). In all of these cases, the ostensible theory in the label actually refers to a broad paradigm that governs the formulation of theories (Laszlo, 1974). When one refers to one of the foregoing labels in common practice, it is usually a reference to the larger paradigm, but sometimes the intent is genuinely to restrict the discussion to observations that fit the selected paradigmatic vernacular’s terminology and points of emphasis. For example, a reference to systems theory may anticipate observations about the self-organizing structure of organizations in general, in which case the reference could just as well have been to complexity or chaos theory. However, discussions of specific phenomena demand greater faithfulness to a single vernacular. For example, equifinality belongs to systems theory (Bertalanffy, 1950), while resilience is the term in complexity theory (Zeleny, 1985), even though these refer fundamentally to the same phenomenon. Certainly, a best practice is to use the specific label if the intent is to cite common characteristics in the associated terminology. Accordingly, systems theory is most apt for addressing systems with boundaries, complexity theory fits when the intent is to discuss nonlinear dynamics, and chaos theory is most appropriate with highly diffuse systems.

If chaos refers to a lack of order, then any reference to chaos theory is capable of causing confusion, because chaotic systems manifest order by definition (Thiétart & Forgues, 1995). To help remedy this, Hock (1995) referred to chaotic systems as chaordic (chaotic in appearance at a local level, while orderly at a macrological level). The central feature of a chaordic system is that it is a product of local rules of interaction among self-similar but independent actors (*e.g.*, ants in an ant colony), from which an often recognizable, higher-order structure emerges (Chua, 2005). At the local level, the agents of the action have something in common (*i.e.*, they are self-similar), but their interaction may appear chaotic to observers who are incapable of visualizing the entire structure in their mind’s eye, or from some great height above it. Chaotic systems usually seem both diffuse and volatile to some extent, but there is wide variation among them on this measure. Highly diffuse natural systems include clouds, as well as hurricanes. Moderately diffuse systems
include ant colonies, as well as flocks of birds in flight. For the person who wants to visualize the whole while examining local interaction, it is apt to imagine the entire cloud while studying the suspended droplets, the entire hurricane while studying the movement of water and air, the entire ant colony while studying the ants, or the entire aviary formation while studying the birds.

Lorenz’s (1972) “butterfly effect” is certainly the most famous reference to chaos theory. Although this term obviously emphasizes nonlinear dynamics, which should usually merit the complexity theory vernacular, it also implies extreme diffuseness, hence the appropriateness of the reference to chaos theory. Images such as that of a butterfly’s inordinate effect on weather patterns are readily available to affective visualization, especially with today’s proliferation of highly sophisticated computer-generated imagery (CGI) in audiovisual production. To be sure, the butterfly effect has little role to play in the present paper’s intended mode of visualization, but the principle of selecting affectively provocative imagery is indeed relevant.

Other compelling concepts in chaos theory are strange attractors (Ruelle & Takens, 1971) and fractality (Mandelbrot, 1977). An attractor per se is any final shape toward which a system evolves under a given set of conditions (Minor, 1985). For example, a tornado seeks the shape of a funnel, which form is the mathematical result of the algorithms that tornadic behavior obeys. Simple attractors, which are mathematically rational by reference to Hausdorff dimensionality (Hausdorff, 1919), correspond to familiar geometric functions, such as points, lines, and spheres. Hausdorff dimensionality assigns a value of zero to a point, one to a line, two to a plane, and so forth. Ordinary attractors have integer dimensionality, but strange attractors, which correspond to a vast variety of shapes in nature, deviate from that rule. The most famous strange attractor is the Lorenz attractor (Lorenz, 1963), which has a Hausdorff dimensionality of approximately 2.06, seems to want to exist on exactly two intersecting planes, and resembles a butterfly’s wings. The dimensionalities of the British and Norwegian coastlines are 1.25 (Mandelbrot, 1967) and 1.52 (Feder, 1988), respectively. As Vallacher and Nowak (1997) explained, “A fractal curve […] has properties of both a line (one dimension) and a surface (two dimensions)” (p. 89).

Clearly, it is infeasible to discuss strange attractors without also discussing fractality, or the cross-level shape-defining phenomenon characteristic of chaotic systems. Mandelbrot (1967) first called this mathematical observation “fractional” (p. 636), finally saying “fractal” eight years later (Mandelbrot, 1975, p. 3825). The key to recognizing fractality is in the observation that the same elemental structure recurs at multiple levels of magnification. A tree is fractal, because its branches follow the same basic design as the whole tree, the sprigs look like small versions of the branches, and so on. Recalling that the word was original fractional, major branches will be some fraction of the size of the tree, minor ones the same relative fraction, sprigs the same, and leaves the same. As it turns out, fractality involves strange attractors by definition (Lorenz, 1994).

BEING THE LÓGOS

All premeditation uses imagination to clarify proposed actions. The more consistently one can deviate from convention in imagining the possibilities necessary to meet one’s goals, whether artistic or practical, the more creative one is (cf. Simpson, 1922). Interestingly, Simpson’s (1922) discussion of the creative genius in the context of one’s use of the imaginative faculty anticipates
the word διάνοια (διάνοια), by which modern Greeks mean “genius,” which, as also noted below, Strong (1996) also rendered “imagination,” in addition to “deep thought” (p. 22).

The method proposed herein to evoke affect for the purpose of self-leadership is that of being the Lógos. As the following discussion will seek to elucidate, the image evokes fantastic, rather than realistic, imagery. Yet the goal in the choice of the ideas that shape it is to convey a palpable construction of metaphorical truth, rather than conspicuous fiction. For this reason, the choice of imagery originates in a simple but bold core idea from Greek philosophy, coupled with an explicit nexus to a common element of Christian tradition from the Greek Scriptures, explored anew against the backdrop of the noted philosophy. In addition, access to chaos theory serves to reinforce the validity of the evoked image, because true order in a chaotic system is visible only from a vantage point high above the system, but behavioral systems are largely invisible, so the distal image demands imagination without the invalidating role of pure invention. Meanwhile, the motivation behind the appeal to Greek and Christian thought is speculation that the imagery sought for the purpose of affective self-leadership should take advantage of transcendental ideas that resonate deeply with the self-leader in question. A culture that claims a dual Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian heritage would thus suggest seeing its core ideas from that dual heritage, rather than any culturally superficial form of abstraction. The core ideas adopted for this purpose are therefore from Socrates, the Bible, and chaos theory.

Μύθος and Λόγος: An Introduction

Levin (1959) defined both μύθος (μύθος) and λόγος (λόγος) as “word” (p. 223). Noting consequently that “mythology” signifies “word of words” (ibid.), he then went on to specify the difference: While the meaning of μύθος in Homer refers to speech (speaking), λόγος in the same refers to a tale (spoken). It is in this juxtaposition that one of the more esoteric understandings of the role of Jesus Christ among 1st-century Greeks reveals itself. Positioned against the backdrop of the Socratic philosophical concept of the divided line (cf. Hackforth, 1942), the identification of Jesus as the Word (ho λόγος, o λόγος, John 1:1, cf. Harner, 1973) takes on compelling depths of meaning beyond the common discourse. First, μύθος lacks the connotation of fables that has colored the word in its various translations over the centuries. First-century Greeks understood μύθος as the expression of truth as comprehensible “on the plane of universalized experience” (Levin, 1959, p. 224), a variety of truth that is pure, unlike that of concrete (hence error-ridden) human existence. Second, the semantic relationship between λόγος and μύθος is analogous to the contrast between the lower and upper portions of the Socratic divided line. Thus it was that Jesus descended from the realm of μύθος to become the Lógos.

As a visitor from a higher realm, the Lógos would have found common earthly sources of worry and strife to be small and inconsequential, as distance would have smoothed the otherwise rough texture of humanity’s difficult existence. Being in the eye of a hurricane is challenging, but it is easier when one understands the behavior of a hurricane. Walking among human beings, the Lógos would have perceived the frenzy of human activity from such a far-reaching perspective as to reduce it to a minor consideration compared to the larger issue of the trajectory of his mission. Exercising an assurance of an eventual return to his realm of origin, he would have felt no fear for his own circumstance, while compassion for the plight of others, both softened and balanced by that same conceptual distance, would have moved him to respond empathetically, but never
impulsively. Indeed, he would have carried with him a chronically palpable feeling that all that is tangible is a fragile, ephemeral façade that masks the glow of a more enduring reality.

An unappreciated gift legated by the Lógos is perhaps precisely his example in being the Lógos. Human beings rely on a powerful imagination to plan their lives (cf. Perky, 1910), which includes envisioning potential events before their occurrence as a means of mental preparation. They bring their imagination to bear on every project, especially insofar as that project entails creativity. Imagination thus creates reality through the application of human agency. In the same manner as the 1st-century Greeks, it may sometimes be helpful to set aside one’s preconceptions about the innate falsity of imagined themes, to enable the imagination to serve as a representation of reality-in-the-making, rather than simple fantasy. If conation is sufficient to render imagined themes reality, then the ostensible fiction of those themes is effectively fictitious.

Imagining oneself as the Lógos, one whose origin is a superordinate reality unbound by the petty trials of organizational urgency, is an exercise of merit to the quest for sanity. In this exercise, one first equips oneself with as lucid an apprehension of the governing themes as one can achieve, and then one strives to visualize the imagery with a visceral tone. The reference to the Classical Greek notion of \( \text{mýthos} \) as a higher form of reality rather than simply a world of creative fictions is important to the exercise, because effective visualization of an affectively leveraged image requires some measure of a willful suspension of disbelief. Therefore, it should benefit from a reminder to the thinker that it represents a very old, eternal truth, which most people have since forgotten. The next section of this paper discusses what may appear at first to be an unrelated theme, but the intention is to unify the themes afterward, to enhance the sensation of universality in the eternal truths thus conveyed.

**The Socratic Illustration of the Divided Line**

According to Plato (360 BCE/1999), Socrates illustrated the difference between a domain accessible to the intellect and that of immediate human experience (i.e., what thought is capable of portraying versus what one’s senses perceive) in the form of a line divided into two unequal segments (p. 206). The upper, larger segment represents the domain of \( \text{epistêmê} \) (\( \varepsilon\pi\sigma\tau\varepsilon\mu\eta \)), the mind, while the lower, smaller segment represents the domain of \( \text{dóxa} \) (\( \delta\omicron\omicron\varepsilon\alpha \)), the senses. In turn, by dividing each of the two domains into two further segments in the same proportionality as in the first instance, Socrates illustrated the two primary subdivisions of each domain to elucidate a desired symmetry. In the \( \text{dóxa} \) domain, characterized by constant change, there are both physical objects in the upper realm and their shadows and reflections in the lower. This creates an analog by which to understand the \( \text{epistêmê} \) domain, characterized by perfect permanence, namely, that the lower realm consists of the shadows of the upper realm. Now, however, those shadows refer to pure concepts and symbols, such as the pure ideas of geometrical shapes. Thus, to understand what exists in the upper realm of \( \text{epistêmê} \), one must imagine what original substance can cast a shadow that happens to appear as a pure concept.

The key to understanding the illustration lies in the uneven size of the segments. Because the larger and smaller domains are in the same proportionality as the larger and smaller realms in each domain, it is a mathematical fact that the lower realm of the \( \text{epistêmê} \) domain and the upper realm of the \( \text{dóxa} \) domain are identical in size. For example, for every roughly circular object in


*dóxa*, one draws the inference of a pure circle in *epistēmē*. Rational thought involves abstracting (into *epistēmē*) pure concepts from direct experience in *dóxa*, in addition to the converse process, which would be to imagine the configurations of one’s ideas in *epistēmē* and reproduce them in *dóxa*, albeit with imperfect implements and effects. The physical realm is thus an approximation of the lower realm of the domain of the mind. In similar fashion to the way that scholars separate pure from applied research, the lower realm of the domain of the mind corresponds to the former, where understanding occurs, while the upper realm of the domain of the senses corresponds to the latter, where application occurs. Of what then is the object of pure research merely a shadow or reflection? This was the point of the illustration. The upper realm of the domain of the mind is the philosophical realm, the realm of pure principles, such as the principles of goodness, justice, and beauty. Here exist pure forms (*eîdē*, εîδη), pure essences (*ousies*, οοσίες), and first principles (*arkhēs*, αρχές). Figure 1 illustrates the divided line.

**FIGURE 1**

THE DIVIDED LINE (USING THE PROPORTIONS OF THE GOLDEN RATIO)

| Ultimate knowledge, realm of pure forms, essences, first principles |
|------------------------|---------------|
| νόησις | nōēsis | ἐπιστήμη epistēmē |
| Genius, understanding, realm of pure concepts |
| διάνοια | diánoia |
| Faith, belief, doctrine, physical realm |
| πίστις | pístis | δόξα dōxa |
| Opinions, conjecture, shadows, reflections |
| εἰκασία | eikasia |

(Source: Original)

After Socrates had explained the illustration of the divided line (near the end of Book VI), he presented the allegory of the cave (beginning of Book VII, Plato, 360 BCE/1999, p. 209). This familiar illustration is sufficiently relatable by summarizing its main points. People live in a dark cave and can only see the shadows of objects carried aloft by another society of people, of whom they are unaware, who live in a fire-lit, upper portion of the same cavern. The shadows of various baskets, pots, and sculptures pass back and forth, sometimes accompanied by audible chatter, so the lower-level troglodytes build an entire worldview around the obviously fallacious theories of reality that their limited view inevitably produces. Socrates then hypothesized one trogodyte’s managing to access the upper community, returning to the lower, and then trying to explain his
new understanding in the limited language of the shadowy dwellers below. Socrates next added the lucky troglodyte’s story of a further ascent beyond the domain of the upper cave dwellers and into the sunlit world above. As the troglodyte descends back down into his world of origin, the shock of the sunlight (of truth) leaves him blind. He is thus an object of derision until his ability to see and interact with the dark world gradually returns. For Socrates, this represents four levels of knowledge: (1) the shadow world of the troglodytes; (2) the fire-lit world of the upper cave dwellers, which casts the shadows seen by the lower troglodytes; (3) the shadows and reflections from the objects outside the cave; and (4) the sunlit world of objects, which casts those shadows and reflections.

Sichel’s (1982) rather personal challenge to Egan’s (1981) effort to apply the illustration of the divided line to Piaget’s (1967) pedagogical model happens to provide a lucid summary of the Socratic idea, complete with the necessary key words. Moving from lowest to highest, these key words are: (1) eikasia (εικασία), conjecture; (2) pístis (πίστις), faith or belief; (3) diánoia (διάνοια), genius or understanding; and (4) nóēsis (νόησις), ultimate knowledge. Of these, two occur in the New Testament, pístis and diánoia, while gnōsis (γνώσις) occurs wherever a reader might expect nóēsis. (The difference between gnōsis and nóēsis is subtle but perceptible in their respective verb roots, which are gignōskō, γιγνώσκω, to know or understand, and noéō, νοέω, to see or perceive.) In Green (1986), pístis always means “faith” (e.g., Matthew 9:22, p. 744), while diánoia usually means “mind” (e.g., Matthew 22:37, p. 758) but may also mean “thought” (Luke 1:51, p. 787), “intellect” (Ephesians 4:18, p. 908), or “understanding” (1 John 5:20, p. 948). In addition to this, Strong’s (1966) interpretation is “deep thought” or “imagination” (p. 22). Gnōsis always signifies “knowledge” (e.g., Luke 1:77, Green, 1986, p. 787), to which Strong (1966) has added “science” (p. 19). The closest New Testament analog to eikasia is ágnoia (ἀγνοία), which means ignorance. Perhaps recalling the cave, Ephesians 4:18 explains that ágnoia alienates one from God, which darkens the intellect (skotizō, σκοτίζω, to darken) (Green, 1986, p. 908).

The nexus between the Christian Lógos and the Classical Greek separation between the world of mýthos and that of lógos, which the Socratic illustration of the divided line has brought into the domain of believability, now comes in a rereading of one of the most frequently quoted parts of the Greek New Testament against the backdrop of the foregoing overview. The first five words of the Book of John in English, “In the beginning was the Word” (John 1:1, Green, 1986, p. 818, italic in the original), seem to place the Lógos in a temporal beginning. However, upon rereading the passage in its original Greek, en arkhē en ho lógos (ἐν αρχῇ ἐν ο λόγῳ), the reader familiar with the foregoing discussion may recall that first principles (arkhēs, ἄρχης) exist in the upper realm of the domain of the mind. Thus, a new meaning emerges, which places the origin of the Lógos in the upper realm of the domain of a greater reality, which the Ancient Greeks called mýthos: In first principle (arkhē, ἄρχη) was the Lógos. Thus, the Lógos is one who resided in the upper domain (mýthos), looking far down upon the earth, from the realm of ultimate knowledge. Descending to the lower domain (lógos), transitioning from speaking to spoken, he remained that original being but now interacted with the world as part of it, as Lógos, along with it. This may have been the concept of the Lógos understood by many Greeks of the time. It thus affords the sense of a mystical, transcendental truth that evokes an affective sense of identity that is capable of carrying someone through a taxing environment with positive core affect intact.
Chaos Theory as a Mode of Visualization

Because chaos theory is the most appropriate vernacular in which to describe extremely diffuse systems (e.g., hurricanes), it is also the most useful of the approaches to the science of self-organizing complexity for visualizing highly complex processes in their greatest abstraction. By comparison, an open system (systems theory) tends to evoke a sense of the porous boundary of an organization or other dynamics as viewed from the inside. It is helpful in conveying a sense of the whole, but its constituent points of emphasis are sometimes too concrete. The vernacular of complex systems is better in this regard, and it may be sufficient for many people, but there may remain some degree of proximity to the system in the visualization, depending on the self-leader’s own frame of reference. By comparison, chaos theory’s implicit invitation to visualize volatile systems such as hurricanes, tornadoes, ocean movement, and beach erosion makes the temptation to look inside the system for moving parts most difficult.

As noted previously, chaos theory also injects an element of rationality into an otherwise fantastic image of a mysterious world of shadows as seen from far above. It is real science, rather than merely a metaphor, so it helps legitimate the imagery of being in the upper domain, while a puppet of oneself is actually roaming the earth, feigning human behavior as a way of speaking the language of the troglodytes. Meanwhile, the imagined state of being in that upper domain, which benefits from intellectual coloring by virtue of the fact that Socrates was referring to levels of knowledge, happens to coincide in perspective with visualizing the earth from far above it, as in the case of satellite imagery of hurricanes. Fractal geometry also injects an important element of realism into the visualization, by enabling the self-leader to maintain a sense of the unseen structure that binds the system’s agents to their characteristic patterns of action and reaction. In turn, visualizing fractality also reinforces the effort to visualize the edifice holistically.

FIGURE 2
COGNITIVE SELF-LEADERSHIP MODEL

(Source: Adapted with adjustments from the thought self-leadership model, Neck & Manz, 1992)
An Affective Model of Self-Leadership

From Neck and Manz (1992), Figure 2 presents a model of cognitive (rational, thought) self-leadership, for comparison against the affective model presented in Figure 3. The cognitive model presents some altered terminology to emphasize its cognitive nature and so to contrast it more concisely from its affective counterpart. In addition, it depicts self-efficacy rather than the original perceived self-efficacy, because the latter is redundant. The model also depicts rational beliefs instead of beliefs per se, because this is what Neck and Manz (1992) meant, and beliefs per se are ambiguous in the present context, given the philosophical and spiritual dimension of the foregoing discussion. Furthermore, in place of mental imagery, the model shows cognitive imagery, because the former label is too general for the present context. The imagery of which Neck and Manz (1992) wrote in this sense is of a task process variety, such as that experienced by athletes in their own cognitive preparation to undertake an athletic challenge. Lastly, instead of emotional state, the model depicts core affect, consistent with Seo et al. (2004).

The affective model (Figure 3) duplicates the cognitive model to the extent possible. Its greatest deviation from the original cognitive model is that it leaves out beliefs (labeled rational beliefs in the original). The reason for this is that, while the question of the influence of rational (as opposed to irrational or negative) beliefs is valid in the larger psychological process, adopting the creative philosophical theme as discussed in the present paper is probably incompatible with the premise that irrational beliefs may simultaneously be of any influence. Specifically, irrational beliefs, according to Neck and Manz (1992), consist of negative expectations and any conjecture that may substantiate them. For example, the self-leader in training may believe that a clique of coworkers is conspiring with his supervisor to destroy him. If that is the belief, then the adoption of the creative philosophical theme should nullify it in the sense of rendering any such possibility irrelevant (rather than necessarily untrue).

FIGURE 3
AFFECTIVE SELF-LEADERSHIP MODEL

(Source: Original)
The affective model also swaps self-talk and mental imagery (which is affective imagery in this version), because this kind of exercise should influence mental imagery directly, rather than depending on self-talk. Moreover, affective imagery is unlike cognitive imagery, given that the former involves visualizing oneself as occupying a vantage point high above the organization, while the latter involves visualizing task processes in motion. The implication of this difference is that cognitive and affective mental imaging may indeed demand such a fundamentally distinct approach. Specifically, if affective imaging merely involved the same task process visualization as in cognitive imaging, then the difference would have to be that of the self-leader's trying to feel, rather than see, the process. While it is conceivable within limits, and it probably has some merit, it would at least involve a combination of cognitive and affective imaging simultaneously. In that case, there would be no affective model *per se*, but rather simply an affectively enhanced cognitive model.

Lastly, the affective model also predicts a direct link between affective imagery and both core affect and scripts. In the original cognitive model, these links are absent. The absence of the link between imagery and core affect in the cognitive model is because task process visualization only affects thought patterns directly. As for the link between imagery and scripts in the cognitive model, it is actually possible that both cognitive self-talk and cognitive imagery moderate scripts, because cognitive scripts operate mainly when the individual ceases to think actively (Schank & Abelson, 1977), and cognitive self-leadership seeks to enhance the salience of conscious thought in goal-oriented behavior. However, Neck and Manz (1992) ignored specifically affective scripts (Demorest & Alexander, 1992), which operate as regulators of affect in interpersonal interaction. Probably more than in the case of cognitive scripts, the imagery used in affective self-leadership should nullify affective scripts. Thus, if the model proves valid, then training in affective self-leadership will result in stronger, more resilient core affect. By Seo et al.'s (2004) definition, this effect means that anxiety and nervousness will decline in the self-leader. Moreover, if affective self-leadership also makes core affect more resilient, the effect will last longer.

**PROPOSITIONS**

In light of the foregoing discussion, this paper advances some theoretical propositions in the general form of Neck and Manz's (1992) propositions, excepting one feature. That is, in the case of cognitive self-leadership, it was logical for Neck and Manz (1992) to present alternative propositions for the primary ones, because the primary propositions mostly advance predictions based on a high measure of a variable, such as positive or negative self-statements, constructive or destructive internal dialog, and constructive or destructive self-talk. However, affective self-leadership seems to lend itself more to a focus on training than on initial psychological states. The reason for this is that the exercise is distinct from common practice, excepting possibly that of meditation, in which case the same assumption would prevail, that the relevant difference will be whether an individual has indeed engaged in the exercise.

P1. Individuals who engage in affective self-leadership will be more likely to adopt positive self-statements.

P2. Individuals who engage in affective self-leadership will demonstrate stronger core affect in the form of reduced activation.
P3. Individuals who engage in affective self-leadership will demonstrate stronger core affect in the form of reduced unpleasantness.

P4. Affective visualization will moderate the salience of affective scripts.

Given the possibility of variations in the parameters of affective self-leadership, further propositions may warrant consideration. For example, if the individual is incapable of achieving a palpable connection to the imagery, the result will be an absence of the expected core affect, which may undermine the process. The first considerations involve the use of a faulty premise in achieving the key imagery.

P5. Application of a philosophical premise that is incongruous with the individual’s national culture will reduce the impact of the affective self-leadership exercise.

P6. Application of a philosophical premise that is incongruous with the individual’s religious beliefs will reduce the impact of the affective self-leadership exercise.

The degree of believability in the imagined scenario is also a variable that may obstruct the intended outcome. Leveraging the paradigm of self-organizing complexity seems necessary to maintain the credibility of the resulting image, but most people have enormous trouble in trying to understand the paradigm. At any rate, it is reasonable to predict that the personal believability of the visualization will moderate the effectiveness of the exercise, hence the next proposition.

P7. Difficulty in believing in the philosophical premise will reduce the impact of the affective self-leadership exercise.

**DISCUSSION**

The present paper has advanced a model of affective self-leadership and illustrated the proposed basis for developing a technique to evoke selected philosophical foundations that might resonate affectively with Americans and other affiliates of the Western civilization. Propositions anticipate that the successful employment of affective self-leadership will counteract or negate negative core affect along the two dimensions indicated by Seo et al. (2004), namely, activation (which becomes anxiety when it is negative, as opposed to exuberance when it is positive) and unpleasantness (which becomes pleasantness when it is positive). An additional expectation is that the exercise will nullify affective scripts. To borrow Berlew’s (1979) expression from his discussion of how generating organizational excitement through successful dyadic leadership may bring about high core affect, affective self-leadership anticipates that those who exercise it will “feel stronger and more in control of their own destinies” (p. 347).

Anecdotal observations of efforts to deal with anxiety-driving organizational challenges, as well as to engage in effective public speaking, suggest that one’s removal from highly stressful circumstances and temporary immersion into an environment that confers a professional sense of dignity may result in a sustainably high state of core affect upon return to the original arena. This may seem to hint at taking a relaxing vacation, but that remedy is actually less effective, because it merely removes the person from the source of the affective pressure for a while. It does little to supplant an irrational belief set with a constructive one. Instead, the alternative environment may
present an alternative set of demands for strong achievement. If a constructive set of identity cues characterizes that alternative set, there should be no expectation that it will merely exacerbate the effects of the original environment. The key difference is the change in identity cues, rather than merely the withdrawal from the stressful environment.

That is, a stressful work environment can alter a person’s self-identity. This can reveal itself when a person responds to questions about personal choices with irrational beliefs (of the type discussed by Neck & Manz, 1992), which seem correct in the context but unduly pessimistic when in a more constructive context. However, if negative or irrational beliefs are a product of the stressful work environment, then withdrawing from that environment into one in which an alternative, positive belief system prevails, can create a variety of positive core affect that may be sustainable for a while after the return to the stressful environment.

In practice, this positive core affect is sustainable for several weeks with the exercise in affective self-leadership, or up to about a week without it. After some introspection, a recognition emerges that much of the benefit has to do with visualizing the organization from a vast distance, metaphorically from existential (or perhaps exponential, in reference to fractal geometry) orbit. This sense of mental distancing is a product of actively exercising a habit of thinking in terms of chaos theory; in other words, the credibility of the visualized state is important to affective self-leadership. To reflect upon the phenomenon, it is clear that the visualized state in affective self-leadership must be quite different from the practice of task process imaging that is characteristic of athletes. Instead, the process requires palpably believable, affectively resonant imagery.

Affective self-leadership would probably find a place in Goleman’s (1995) reference to self-awareness and self-management in emotional intelligence. Awareness of oneself naturally must precede other phases of personal development, but what is most interesting in Goleman’s model in the present context is the distinction drawn between cognitive and affective aptitude. To date, as Goleman has stated, most attention in both school and work has gone to the former, even though the latter seems to predict success with more consistency. The proposition of a model of affective self-leadership to complement Neck and Manz’s (1992) cognitive model seems to make particularly strong sense against the backdrop of Goleman’s (1995) observations.

Weber’s (1904) theory of the Protestant Work Ethic incorporates a core set of principles that originate in monastic vows (Jones, 2002). At the center of this philosophy lie three values, namely, thrift, self-discipline, and industry, analogs of the monastic vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience according to the Rule of St. Benedict. Recalling Lippmann (1937), Jones (2002) summarized the affective change that results from seeing oneself as being in the presence of God: “The distinctions of this world lose their importance, the pretensions of rulers are rejected, and a person begins for the first time to feel the full significance of individuality” (p. 39). This credible visualization seems to explain Weber’s (1904) observations of 19th-century Protestants’ personal character as positive, industrious people despite hardship. Character, according to Jones (2002), demands a spiritual foundation. If so, then the affective experience may help explain it.
REFERENCES


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